LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FORCE PROTECTION FOR DEPLOYED AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES, PROTECTING AGAINST GROUND ATTACKS IN THE USCENTCOM THEATER
There is one time tested and proven fact about airpower--no other power in the world has the capability to defeat the United States Air Force (USAF) in the air. During the Gulf War, the media broadcast to the world the strength of U.S. airpower and its value and importance to national security. For an adversary eager to neutralize or at least blunt U.S. military power, ground attacks are effective ways, and air bases are choice targets. Project AIR ,FORCE of RAND Research concluded three objectives to ground attacks: (1) destroy high value assets,
(2) temporarily suppress sorties generations at critical times of a conflict, (3) to create a strategic effect.'
The Air Force's growing reliance on unique, high value, surveillance and intelligence aircraft such as Rivet Joint, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Joint Surveillance and Targeting System (JSTARS), and precision performance stealth fighters and bombers in some ways makes airpower more vulnerable than during the Cold A ground attack that disabled only a few of these high profile assets could have a catastrophic effect on an air campaign. Rapid reproduction of modern high-tech aircraft is next to impossible. Sniper fire from a high caliber rifle could easily damage the intricate electronics of an AWACS aircraft.
Shrapnel damage to a stealth aircraft's surface would increase its detectability and decrease its effectiveness. Killing or injuring operators and support personnel could severely disrupt operations. A successful attack on an air base during the build-up or early stages of Desert Shield could have provided ammunition for opponents of U.S. involvement and undermining support for the President's decision to intervene. This paper will canvass force protection measures against ground attacks from strategic to tactical levels for Air Force personnel and resources in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) theater of operations. It is beneficial to first review the history of ground attacks on air bases to segue from security to air base defense to antiterrorism programs to current force protection measures. Additionally, threats and how they are conducted will be probed.
I
Recommendations to strengthen force protection are offered in the conclusion. Security Police were highly effective in detecting and stopping penetrating attacks.
The Vietnamese launched only 21 sapper attacks that caused little damage to Air
Force aircraft.
Ninety-six percent of the attacks were by standoff weapons.
Standoff attacks were extremely difficult to impede.
Additional ground and air patrols were needed to control the standoff footprints.''
After the Vietnam War interest in air base defense declined as after WWll and the Korean Some military leaders were quick to remind that force protection is not the mission.
THE THREAT
"Whether we declare war on terrorist or not. .. terrorist have declared war on usn --USAWC Guest Speaker, February 12,2001 Just as the U. S. learned from history, our adversaries gathered lessons learned. One glaring fact surfaced after every encounter. The might of the U.S. Air Force is overwhelming.
Very few nations have the trained personnel, resources, technology, operational foundation, and fiscal capacity to build or purchase conventional and advanced weaponry to counter USAF operators and aircraft. Those that can do present a threat to USAF operations, but most will probably take a less risk-taking approach. In other words, "if you can't beat them in the air, don't let them get off the ground." Ground attacks on air bases are effective ways.
Expeditionary air operations are the USAF mode of the future. Expeditionary air operation places itself somewhat vulnerable to ground attacks. Settling into bare bases has inherent problems such as limited or no aircraft shelters and infrastructure plus no secure billeting for personnel. Using insecure host nation airports compounds the problem. Storage for fuel is often above ground without access control procedures in place. Parking for high value aircraft can be a nightmare due to over crowed conditions. Deploying to nations with internal threats worsens the ability to employ trusted local nationals.
Project AIR FORCE of RAND Research concluded the ground threat to air bases has increasing probability for several reasons:
Many see ground forces as their best option for countering USAF airpower.
Most nations have special forces or other ground troops capable of conducting some type of attack.
The advanced technologies that make the U.S. military dominant are proliferating to the hands of adversaries, making the threat more lethal.
Known capabilities of U.S. airpower may make air force bases high priority targets.
Expeditionary operations complimented with high value unique aircraft at a few forward bases make the bases more vulnerable to ground attacks.
A successful attack on an U.S. air force base may have a strategic effect out of proportion to the resources expended. Most alarming about both terrorist groups is their capability to purchase and operate components or complete advanced weaponry systems including weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Installation leadership directs additional membership. They discuss anything remotely related to security and force protection. Security Force's leadership at some bases were granted higher security clearances allowing them access to more intelligence information. 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
'
RECOMMENDATIONS
History has shown that airpower is extremely vulnerable on the ground and that air bases are equally as open to attack from the ground as from the air. The Vietnam War dramatized the ability of small unsophisticated forces to wage successful attacks against air bases. The Viet Cong carried out most of their attacks using standoff tactics making, an approach on foot and firing rockets and mortars without penetrating air base perimeters. Our lesson learned was that any adversary with the will could attack an airbase from the ground.
Terrorist or enemy ground attacks on air bases, such as those in the Middle East, could destroy aircraft, disrupt operations, or create a politically damaging event for the United States.
Based upon this study are these recommendations to enhance force protection. The first recommendation is increased information gathering and dissemination. The Downing Commission report stated: "The ability of the theater and national intelligence community to conduct in-depth, long term analysis of trends, intentions, and capabilities of terrorist is d e f i~i e n t . "~~ More emphasis needs to be placed on Human intelligence (HUMIT) collection.
Joint force protection doctrine must be developed to cover normal USCENTCOM theater operations. The Joint Pub for rear area operations essentially covers a major theater of war.
USAF force protection doctrine covers ..." when they are not directly engaged with the enemy." 
